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 The author deals with the political and military aspects of the conflict be-
tween Croatia and Serbia. Starting from global political circumstances in which 
this conflict emerged and developed, he describes the political goals of the 
conflicting parties, their strategies and military organization as well as the 
stages of the war in Croatia. After this war, nothing has been the same in 
Croatia. Croatia has, much sooner than expected and with fewer victims, 
realized its political goals. Besides the international recognition and the 
establishment of its authority on almost entire state territory, Croatia has 
become a major military force. However, the war in Croatia has significantly 
hindered democratic processes which, in turn, has stood in the way of its 
taking part in the European integrational processes. Serbia is the loser of this 
war in every, primarily military respect. The consequence of the Serbian 
instigatory politics in Croatia has not only been Serbian exodus from Croatia, 
but the socially unenviable position in which the remaining Serbs in Croatia 
find themselves. By becoming proponents of Serbian global politics and failing 
to bring their interests in line with those of Croatia, the leadership of the 
seditious Croatian Serbs accepted the role of an instrument of global national 
politics. As Serbian national politics was losing ground and giving up on 
previous goals - the creation of a great national state - Serbs in Croatia 
became victims of this politics. 
 
 Introduction 
 The Croato-Serbian conflict, which culminated in the war that was 
fought in Croatia, is specific in many ways. It is yet to be fully re-
searched and the findings should be made widely available, particularly to 
those who can use the experience of this war to help prevent future con-
flicts. The experience of the war in Croatia might be beneficial to other 
countries helping them to define their defense strategies and develop their 
defense systems. It is on these lines that we shall discuss the basic char-
acteristics of the Croato-Serbian conflict and war in Croatia by analyzing 
its four aspects: political, military-strategic, organizational and operational, 
on both belligerent parties. 
 Social changes in the former Yugoslavia, particularly the events that 
took place in the late sixties and early seventies, the 1974 Constitution, 
the democratic changes in Croatia and Slovenia, the introduction of politi-
cal pluralism and the multi-party system and the new political forces in 
power, all this threatened the political achievements of the so called 
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“fraternity and unity”. Social changes in SFRY, which were directed to-
wards democratization and national and republic independence, undermined 
socialism as the basis of the multinational federation. This is why dogmatic 
forces, especially those in the JNA1 and the federal administration, felt 
threatened and therefore strongly opposed any democratic process in order 
to preserve the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a centrally or-
ganized federation, in which they could maintain their positions. This is 
clearly seen in what Veljko Kadijevi}, the then Federal Secretary of Na-
tional Defense, said: “The moment when the multi-party system was intro-
duced in Yugoslavia and the way in which it was done marked the end 
of Yugoslavia within its up-to-then borders. We had, as I said earlier, 
clearly and publicly foreseen this. The meeting of the military leadership 
with the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Croatia in Zagreb one 
month prior to the multi-party elections in Croatia provided a clear ex-
ample of such forecasts. We told them straightforwardly that they - the 
leadership of the Socialist Republic of Croatia - would allow ustashas to 
come to power in Croatia. There were some reactions, but they did not 
get too excited”2 
 After the multi-party elections in Slovenia and Croatia in 1990, and 
particularly after the declaration of their independence in June 1991, when 
it became clear that there was little left of former Yugoslavia, the federal 
government aided by the JNA started the war, first against Slovenia, and 
shortly after that against Croatia. In the war against Croatia the JNA was 
joined by paramilitary forces formed by rebel Croatian Serbs. Even before 
the war started this had been announced by the leader of the Serbian 
Democratic Party (SDS)3 at a rally at Vo}in in Western Slavonia early in 
1991 when he said: “If a war breaks out between the Croatian state and 
 
  1When the Yugoslav League of Communists dissolved, the Yugoslav National 
Army (JNA) lost the ideological grounds on which it had been built, and by the 
break-up of SFRY it lost both its material and geographic basis. This made its 
existence questionable. Since it involved 150,000 people, out of which 50% were 
professionals, and the majority being Serbs, Montenegrins and Yugoslavs, their 
existential fear can be easily understood. Many of them were prepared to engage 
in a war in order to preserve SFRY and keep their positions. 
  2Kadijevi} Veljko, Moje vi|enje raspada, Politika, Beograd, 1993, p. 92. 
  3Serbian Democratic Party was founded in Croatia in Knin on February 17, 
1990. In the first democratic Croatian elections in 1990 the party won 5 seats in 
the Parliament, but soon withdrew from the Croatian Sabor (parliament). The party 
leadership encouraged Croatian Serbs not to accept the Croatian government and 
instead support efforts for territorial secession of “Serbian” areas from Croatia and 
the establishment of Serbian autonomies in Croatia (“SAO Krajina” - Knin, 
December 22, 1990; SAO Western Slavonia - August 13, 1991, SAO Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem - February 26, 1991), which were later called 
the “Republic of Serbian Krajina”. 
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the Serbian people, it will be a war between the Croatian state and the 
JNA.”4 
 In 1980s the strategy of silence and non-resistance to efforts to pre-
serve the socialist centralized federal state, as advocated by the Serbian 
nationalist leadership, was continuously applied in Croatia. However, the 
process of democratization started in Croatia in the late eighties, and this 
was soon followed by the establishment of over fifty political parties. Most 
of them were constituted on national principles. In the first democratic 
elections, which were held between April 22 and May 17, 1990, the Croa-
tian Democratic Union (HDZ)5 won. This party managed to fully express 
the basic aims and interests of the majority of Croats in Croatia and 
Croatian emigrants. The elections led to a new parliamentary structure 
with a HDZ majority. The HDZ's inauguration ceremony was charged with 
national feelings, which led to varied reactions both in Croatia and world-
wide, among which prevailed those which suggested possible dangers in-
volved in the practical moves of the new government. This was followed 
by some political moves due to which the new Croatian government expe-
rienced attacks from various sides. Political forces outside Croatia which 
favoured the preservation of the SFRY did not support it, and in Croatia 
the threats by Croatian rebel Serbs and dogmatic communists were getting 
more serious and overt. Their dissatisfaction was increased by the new 
Croatian spirit, the new free approach to history, especially World War II, 
and the presentation of the new Croatian identity in the media.6 
 
 Political goals of the belligerent parties 
 Serbian political goals 
 In the late eighties Serbian global national policy came into open with 
the idea of “a great Serbian state which will realize the dream (once sac-
rificed for Yugoslavia) of all Serbs living together in one state. This ac-
counts for the contradictory ideas of the Serbian state - a strong Yugoslav 
federation (overtly) and a great Serbia (covertly).7 With this as their 
 
  4Vjesnik of January 21, 1991, p. 6. 
  5Croatian Democratic Union was founded in Zagreb on June 17, 1989; its 
program was published on November 22, 1989, and its first national convention, 
which took place on February 24-25, 1990 lead to different responses in Croatia 
and the international community. After the Convention, the leader of the Croatian 
Social Democratic Party, called HDZ a “party of dangerous intentions”. 
  6See: Tatalovi} Sini{a, “Peaceful Solutions of Conflicts in Croatia: Case Study of 
Gorski Kotar”, Peace and the Sciences, No. 6/1996, pp. 38-39. 
  7Popov Neboj{a (ed.), Srpska strana rata - Trauma i katarza u istorijskom 
pam}enju, Republika, Beograd, 1996, p. 41. 
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starting point, Serbian nationalist politicians, the leadership of the JNA 
and the leadership of rebel Serbs in Croatia defined their political goals 
in several variants: 
 1. To prevent the possible independence of the Republic of Croatia, 
thus maintaining it in the new Yugoslav federation by making use of the 
existing constitutional position of Croatian Serbs (that of a constitutive 
nation); 
 2. If the first goal proves unattainable, a part of the Croatian territory 
following the line Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica is to be invaded with 
the assistance of the JNA, structured as a state and joined with other 
“Serbian states”; 
 3. If the second goal proves unattainable, with the assistance of the 
JNA and the local Serbs the largest possible portion of the Croatian terri-
tory is to be invaded, put under the protection of the international com-
munity for as long as possible, that is, until the conditions for its annexa-
tion are fulfilled; 
 4. In case the third goal proves unattainable, as many Croatian Serbs 
as possible are to be protected, including their withdrawal from Croatia to 
the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus improv-
ing the local demographic situation.8 
 The analysis of military and political developments in the last six years 
shows that these goals had been formulated before they became opera-
tional and that they were realized gradually, according to the current 
situation on the battleground and international circumstances. 
 
 Croatian political goals 
 The main Croatian political goal was the establishment of an independ-
ent and sovereign Croatian state, either in the short or the long run. For 
the realization of this goal necessary constitutional changes were made by 
the passing of the new Croatian Constitution on December 22, 1990, 
which defines Croatia as the “national state of the Croatian nation and 
the state of members of other nations and minorities, who are its citizens: 
Serbs, Moslems, Slovenes Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews and 
 
  8Some Serbian authors discuss only one goal. So Konstantin Obradovi}, for 
example, in regard to Serbian rejection of the “Z-4” plan says: “Since the very 
beginning of the conflict Krajina Serbs have clearly had only one, openly 
proclaimed goal - secession from Croatia and integration with other parts of the 
Serbian people within a restored, no matter how much “reduced” Yugoslavia, or 
expecting this to happen, creation of their own independent state”. Obradovi} 
Konstantin, “Plan ’Z-4’: sadr`ina i i doma{aj”, Me|unarodna politika, No. 
1031/1995, p. 3. 
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others, who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality 
and the realization of ethnic rights in accordance withe the democratic 
norms of the United Nations Organization and the free world countries.”9 
The establishment of the independent national state of the Croatian nation 
was to be realized preferably by negotiation and peacefully, but, if neces-
sary, by other means. Croatian government was aware of the fact that 
immediate and full constitution of an independent and sovereign state 
would not be possible, which is why it put forward the proposal to form 
a confederal state with the other republics of former Yugoslavia, as a ba-
sis for political negotiations. However, at the same time the Croatian gov-
ernment started preparations for the development of armed Croatian forces 
in case Croatian survival and state independence is to be fought for by 
arms. 
 
 Strategies of the belligerent parties 
 Serbian strategy 
 A detailed analysis of the war in Croatia reveals the existence of cer-
tain war strategies in both belligerent parties. 
 The course of the war in Croatia demonstrated that the Serbian side, 
which consisted of Croatian rebel Serbs, the JNA and paramilitary groups 
of volunteers from Serbia, applied the strategy of low and medium inten-
sity conflict, which also included the rebellion strategy.10 Low intensity con-
flict, which is the most common type of conflict in modern circumstances, 
represents a synthesis of armed and unarmed fighting, both expressed as 
acts of violence that can be considered as the basic feature of any war. 
 Due to the application of the low intensity conflict strategy, for a long 
time it was difficult to tell whether a real war was fought in Croatia, 
since it was not recognizable in its classic form and had not been de-
clared as some political factors might have expected. Such a situation was 
also created because the application of the low intensity conflict strategy is 
based on the well-known strategic principle that means are set according 
to the size of the goal, which results from the interest level. When classic 
military strategies are applied, these means are predominantly military ones 
 
  9The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Narodne novine, No. 56/1990, p. 
1237. 
  10This strategy was elaborated in military textbooks and rulebooks of the 
majority of modern armies worldwide including the JNA, and it represents one of 
the basic types of warfare in modern circumstances. Low intensity conflict strategy 
is elaborated in American military literature. For example, its detailed description 
can be found in the combat handbook FM 100-20 - Low Intensity Conflict, 
Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, 1988. 
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and can be easily recognized. On the other hand, when low intensity con-
flict strategy is applied, the notion of force is wider in scope and content, 
thus allowing for the choice of various, primarily non-military means. The 
means can at one time be non-military, at another military or the combi-
nation of the two in various forms and with varied intensity. 
 One of the most significant elements of the Serbian strategy in the 
Croatian war was the instigation, organization and development of rebel-
lion11 and the assistance provided by outside factors. To instigate rebellion 
in a country, certain conditions should be fulfilled, such as a low educa-
tional level of the people; a low level of technological knowledge and 
skills, which results in fearing abrupt changes; primitive agriculture; the 
existence of an elite which is not willing to share power of give it up; in-
capability or impossibility for the government to meet the needs of the 
entire population, particularly some ethnic groups etc. All the above men-
tioned conditions were fulfilled in Croatia in the early nineties. 
 However, the rebellion was not started solely due to these general con-
ditions. It was directed, it had its leadership that was trying to convince 
the dissatisfied people that the current government was to blame for their 
problems, and that it was the government that was the source of their in-
security. In order to direct the people to rebellion, the leadership of the 
rebellion used a set of ideas offering solutions to problems, promising a 
better future and justifying violence. This set of ideas was formulated in 
the political strategy of the Serbian Democratic Party, which, taking global 
goals of the Serbian national politics as its starting point, put forward spe-
cific demands to the Croatian government, from those for cultural auton-
omy to those for the secession of the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” from 
Croatia. 
 The rebels' chances to succeed were also influenced by the political 
climate in Croatia. Even when people are oversensitive and when there is 
an element of rebellion leadership, rebellion is not likely to succeed if the 
government rules the entire state territory efficiently. In Croatia, the gov-
ernment was initially not capable of performing all the social functions 
throughout the Croatian territory, primarily due to the great shift of 
power, not just in the legislature, but also in the administration. 
 The strategy and actions of rebel Serbs in Croatia covered a range of 
means varying from predominantly non-violent ones to an almost exclusive 
use of violence. First they applied methods which were legal within the 
existing political system and which did not emphasize overt violence. In 
 
  11The concept of rebellion implies an attempt made by an organized group to 
encourage people of a country or one part of the country to overthrow the 
current government by the use of force. The group's motives can be numerous and 
can vary (ethnic, social, ideological), but one of their aims is definitely to take 
over power using force. 
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their implementation the emphasis was put on the organization of the po-
litical party (SDS), with the development of armed forces being less em-
phasized. After that, efforts were directed to the application of violence, 
including arms. The purpose of this was to create an atmosphere of un-
certainty, primarily through acts of violence. Rebels' aim was to create 
such circumstances in which an incident could instigate a sudden rebellion 
of the people against the Croatian government. In terms of organization, 
rebel parties and armed forces were gradually joined, and the top leader-
ship of the rebellion had a two-fold role - political administration (SDS) 
and administration of the armed elements (officers of the JNA and Terri-
torial Defense - TO). Mass organizations (village watches, non-political or-
ganizations) were being set up and armed surveillance of certain territories 
(road blocks, sentinels, patrols, rallies) was organized. 
 Organizationally, the goal was to create a complex political structure, 
which uses mass civilian organizations and armed elements to confront 
government forces. The ultimate goal was the establishment of the gov-
ernment under the supervision of the rebel party in one part of the Croa-
tian state territory. If the war in Croatia is viewed through the develop-
ment of Serbian action strategy, three stages can be seen: Stage 1 - latent 
or initial rebellion; Stage 2 - guerilla war; Stage 3 - mobile war.12 
 
 Croatian defense strategy 
 Defending its state territory, at the beginning of the war in 1991 the 
Republic of Croatia had not yet had a clearly defined defense strategy, 
but several variants of opposing the JNA and the Serbian forces in Croa-
tia. One of these variants was a military one, which is why Croatia started 
to develop its police and military force at a fast pace. Fully disarmed, 
Croatia largely relied on its emerging police and military forces. The de-
velopment of the military and the defense system led to the outline of 
the defense strategy, which was determined by the following factors: state 
policy, military strategy of the enemy and the international community. 
 State policy was aimed at creating an independent and sovereign state, 
with minimal human and material losses, and it implied a combination of 
diplomatic and military activities. Seeking viable variants of defense strategy 
within the state policy, it soon became clear that the strategy of total na-
tional defense was inappropriate for Croatia, since this defense strategy is 
based on an extremely high level of human engagement, afflictions of ci-
vilians and economic devastation. In 1991 Croatia entered the war with 
modest defense potentials, which included the police force and scanty mili-
tary forces. In order to compensate for its military and technical inferior-
 
  12See: Tatalovi} Sini{a, “Strategija obrane i rat u Hrvatskoj”, Politi~ka misao, 
No. 4/1994, pp. 18-19. 
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ity, Croatia was initially forced to adopt the total national defense strategy, 
but it was gradually abandoned as the war progressed and replaced by the 
state defense strategy. This was reflected not only in the type of arma-
ment, but also in the increasing professionalism of the Croatian Army and 
the totally centralized decision making and management of the defense 
forces. 
 The military strategy of the enemy, being a significant factor, was most 
directly reflected in the Croatian defense strategy. In an attempt to pre-
serve the SFRY, the JNA and its political partners were not in the posi-
tion to apply the official defense strategy, i.e. the strategy of total national 
defense in the early days of war. This strategy was not suitable for inter-
nal conflicts, which required a new strategy to be developed with military 
potentials being suited accordingly. Defense strategy was then replaced by 
offense strategy, also applying the low intensity (to a lesser degree 
medium and high intensity) conflict strategy. The time needed for the 
implementation of these changes in the JNA and the Serbian side was an 
opportunity for the Croatian side to improve its defense positions. 
 The international community expressed its interest in ending the war in 
Croatia by sending UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces. The involvement of 
international factors in the war in Croatia had a strong impact on the de-
fense strategy of the Republic of Croatia as well as the conduct of the 
Serbian side. By accepting the arrival of UNPROFOR on the Croatian 
territory, Croatian state policy expressed, in the first place, its desire to 
bring an end to the war and reintegrate its temporarily occupied territories 
as soon as possible. Such state policy was to be followed by a defense 
strategy. The arrival of the UNPROFOR was seen by the Serbian side as 
an opportunity for “freezing” the existing situation as long as possible, un-
til favorable circumstances for the secession of these territories from the 
Republic of Croatia developed. Such an attitude of the opponent, sup-
ported by the inefficiency of the international community and the UN-
PROFOR, helped make the defense strategy of the Republic of Croatia 
even more active and also include, apart from political means, a military 
option for bringing the temporarily occupied territories back under Croa-
tian control. Croatia continuously strengthened its military and political po-
sition and defense power both due to the pressure imposed on the Ser-
bian side for more cooperation in negotiations and to a possible military 
solution of the status of the temporarily occupied territories. 
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 Organization of the belligerent parties 
 Organization of Serbian forces in Croatia 
 Serbian forces in Croatia were made up of the following basic 
elements: 
1. Party and government administration; 
2. Mass civilian organizations; 
3. Military forces. 
 1. The role of the party and government administration was to define 
the policy and supervise its implementation. In order for this aim to be 
realized, the party and government bodies, which were under its direct su-
pervision, managed the military and mass civilian organizations. Party lead-
ership was closely tied to outside centers of power, which provided various 
forms of assistance to Serbian forces on the battleground. The members of 
government administration on the territory supervised by rebels, were 
largely the most prominent members of the rebel party. 
 2. Mass organizations represented one of the basic instruments used by 
rebels in order to gain influence and supervision over the local population. 
For example, these organizations were used for intelligence purposes, for 
supplying military formations, for enlisting new recruits and the like. Gen-
erally speaking, the purpose of these organizations was to recruit as many 
people as possible for the rebel party. It should be noted that some of 
these recruits were not aware of the fact that they were supposed to get 
involved in the rebellion. There were basically three types of mass organi-
zations: national organizations, special interest groups and local Serbian 
militia that considered themselves as part of the mass civilian or-
ganizations. Their major task was to remove the Serbian population from 
the supervision of the Croatian government. 
 3. Military forces represented an essential instrument for the realization 
of political goals. Serbian military forces were made up of two parts: main 
forces and regional forces.13 Main forces consisted of well-trained and 
highly motivated soldiers (as well as mercenaries), organized into elite 
combat formations. They were supervised and managed from a center 
(headquarters) wherever they were needed. They originated from the for-
 
  13Before July 1991, when the war in Croatia broke fully out, Serbian forces in 
Croatia had about 12,000 men. In this period, JNA forces on the territory of 
Croatia numbered 70,000 soldiers (15,000 in Kninski corps). As the war progressed, 
JNA forces were increasingly deployed in areas with Serbian absolute or relative 
majority, and 4 infantry brigades were deployed in the borderline area of Eastern 
Slavonia and Baranja. These forces consisted of 70 reconnaissance tanks, 178 
medium-weight tanks and 200 artillery devices. In addition to this, there were 870 
volunteers from Serbia with 30,000 volunteers being on the alert. 
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mer JNA and territorial defense structures. Regional forces were recruited 
by the local population and members of mass civilian organizations, the lo-
cal militia and territorial defense. As a rule, their activity was restricted to 
local communities and relatively small territories. Their major task was to 
make sure that the civilians remain loyal to the rebellion. 
 After establishing a stable frontline the military of the “Republic of 
Serbian Krajina” had a total of 55,000 men, but it was estimated that ap-
proximately 40,000 were able to participate in a full-scale war against 
Croatian armed forces. Military service was organized in ground troops 
and air forces, which were deployed on 12,000km2 of the Croatian terri-
tory and which controlled a 600 km long frontline towards Croatia and a 
100km long frontline towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ground troops were 
organized in 5 military corps, 16 infantry brigades (each with 3000 sol-
diers) and 3 tank battalions. About 12,000 soldiers were deployed in east-
ern Slavonia, and they were organized in the Eastern Slavonian Corp 
whose headquarters was in Vukovar. Banijski Corps, which had 10,000 
men and headquarters in Petrinja was in charge of defending Banija. The 
corps consisted of 3 infantry brigades which were deployed in the area of 
Dvor na Uni, Kostajnica and Glina. Kordunski Corps with its headquarters 
in Vrginmost was made up of 3 infantry brigades with a total of 9000 
men. Li~ki Corps with its headquarters in Udbina had about 8000 people 
organized in 3 infantry brigades which were deployed in the area of Ko-
renica, Lapac and Pla{ki. The largest corps, Kninski Corps, had 12,000 
men and its headquarters was in \evrske. Its brigades were deployed in 
Obrovac, Benkovac, [kabrnja and Knin.14 
 
 Organization of Croatian defense 
 It did not take much time for the Croatian government to realize that 
it could not count any longer on the territorial defense, which had been 
completely disarmed just before 1990 elections.15 This is why no attempts 
were made by Croatian government to turn it into its army, but instead 
 
  14Vego, M.: “The Army of Serbian Krajina”, Jane's Intelligence Review, No. 
10/1993, pp. 438-445. 
  15Veljko Kadijevi} explained why the Territorial Defense was disarmed by words: 
“Territorial Defense was to be fully paralyzed in those parts of the country where 
it could serve as the basis for the creation of secessionist republics' armies, or 
secessionist forces. In order to achieve this all territorial defense was disarmed 
before armed conflicts in Yugoslavia started. Apart from this, through some senior 
officers in the Territorial Defense we tried to keep it out of secessionist political 
leaderships' control. We were partly successful in doing this, except in Slovenia. Of 
course, we used the territorial defense of Serbian areas in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina in joint actions with the JNA”. Cf. Kadijevi} Veljko, Moje vi|enje 
raspada, Politika, Beograd, 1993, p. 94. 
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under current legal provisions it developed its police force, which num-
bered about 16,000 men in May 1990. At that time the police consisted 
of regular, special, border and anti-terrorist units. Special units were or-
ganized according to military principles, with military discipline and train-
ing. In cities like Zagreb and Bjelovar regular brigades were established 
within the police. Police forces were poorly armed, which explains the at-
tempts to purchase large quantities of high quality weapons from available 
sources. Through continuous recruitment police forces soon numbered as 
many as 45,000 men: 21,360 in regular units, 1100 in special units and 
22,900 reserves. However, these forces were insufficient for effective de-
fense, which is why Croatia also started setting up new units called Na-
tional Defense, using the existing structures of civilian defense. National 
Defense units were set up on April 7, 1991 in all Croatian cities, towns 
and villages and were assigned various tasks related to armed resistance, 
logistics, and since they were getting armed, they also became combat 
ready. The chief goal was to create armed units, which would, following 
changes in the legal system, become part of the armed forces. These units 
had their own uniforms with special insignia, and they included volunteers 
aged 18-35, organized in classic military formations: squads (10 men), 
platoons (30 men), companies (90 men), battalions (300 men) and brigades 
(1000 men).16 
 In the spring of 1991 Croatia ceased enlisting Croatians in the JNA, 
upon which on April 12, 1991, the National Guard was founded - ZNG. 
It was under immediate leadership of the Ministry of Defence, and was 
first presented to the public on May 28, 1991.17 In the early days of war, 
in late June 1991, Croatian Army, that is the National Guard numbered 
10,000 men, while the Ministry of the Interior had 40,000 men (active and 
reserves). Special and anti-terrorist units had 4000 men and National De-
fence numbered about 90,000 men. National Guard was organized in 4 
brigades with 3-4 battalions each. Each battalion had 4-5 companies with 
80 men. These troops were first to confront the JNA. As the war pro-
gressed, the Croatian Army continuously grew, got stronger and better 
equipped and grew to 200,000 people at the time when Carafe cease-fire 
agreement was signed. Since then, Croatian Army, which managed to stop 
Serbian forces and the JNA from progressing, has undergone reorganiza-
tion, has been equipped and has been reduced to a third. 
 
  16See: Javorovi} Bo`idar, Velikosrpska najezda i obrana Hrvatske, DEFIMI, 
Zagreb, 1995, p. 158. 
  17Need for efficient warfare lead to the new Law on Defense which was passed 
on June 26, 1991, which provided formal prerequisites for the establishment of the 
Croatian Army. This Law provided the basis for the establishment of National 
Guard Corps Command on July 30, the Training Center for Croatian Army 
Officers on September 1, the Croatian Navy on September 11, the Supreme 
Headquarters of the Croatian Army, and the military and territorial organization of 
the Croatian Army was defined in October 1991. 
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 Croatian army recorded its first successful military actions in September 
1991, when 40 barracks throughout the Republic of Croatia were 
blocked.18 The takeover of barracks enhanced Croatia's combat readiness, 
which was soon reflected on the battleground. Inviting JNA officers and 
soldiers to join the Croatian Army in September 1991 was an important 
move, by means of which the Croatian Army grew even stronger. The 
situation on the battleground was gradually improving upon the establish-
ment of the coalition government in September 1991, which was followed 
by the establishment of the Supreme Headquarters of the Croatian army 
and six operational zones.19 By the end of 1991 the Croatian Army had 
been organized in 63 brigades and a large number of independent units. 
Each brigade numbered about 3000 men and in addition to them there 
were 30,000 police, out of which 5000 men took part in armed conflicts 
throughout Croatia. Soon after Sarajevo cease-fire agreement was signed, 
the Republic of Croatia decided to reduce the number of military units 
and the total number of soldiers. In early April 1992, when war broke 
out in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian Army deployed a rela-
tively large number of combat units made up of men originally from Bos-
nia-Herzegovina who had been dismissed from the Croatian Army. Assis-
tance provided for Croatian people in Bosnia- Herzegovina also included 
significant financial resources and logistics. 
 The goal of the Croatian government was to create an army based on 
Israeli, American, German and French models. It was supposed to include 
elite units of professional soldiers, conventional land troops, troops made 
up of recruits doing their military service and troops recruited by reserves. 




  18As a result of coordinated actions, 36 barracks were taken, with four 
remaining under Serbian control (Petrinja, Mirkovci, Vukovar and Karlovac). The 
32nd JNA Corps based in Vara`din was forced to surrender, which was extremely 
significant, since this action resulted in capturing 100 tanks (largely T-55), a large 
number of 155mm howitzers, 10 203mm howitzers and a large number of launchers 
and other equipment. In these barrack takeovers, Croatian Army won a total of 
230 tanks, over 400 heavy arms and huge quantities of light arms and ammunition. 
  19Each operation zone consisted of two or more operation sectors which were 
made up of several brigades and independent battalions as well as special units. At 
that point 24 brigades had been formed, and 10 more were being formed. 
  20Cf. The Military Balance 1996-1997 (Croatia). 
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 The development and stages of the war in Croatia 
 Stage of political and military preparations for the war in the period be-
tween April 22, 1990 and June 26, 1991 
 A number of Croatian Serbs started to prepare for armed rebellion 
long before the first multi-party elections in Croatia. Leadership of Serbian 
volunteer units in Kordun, Banija and Lika was formed on May 6, 1990 
with the aim to prepare armed rebellion in those three regions. Initial 
Serbian efforts to separate from Croatia were marked by the establishment 
of “Joint Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and Lika” in Knin. One of 
the many signs showing that local Serbs were ready for open provocations 
directed to the government in Zagreb was the rally organized in Srb, 
Lika, on July 31, 1990, which gathered about 120,000 people. It was there 
that the Declaration of Serbian Autonomy within Croatia was adopted and 
it contained six provisions. This was also when the “Serbian National 
Council” was established. The Declaration denied the Republic of Croatia 
control of the territories with Serbian majority. Following the rally at a 
meeting held in Knin Serbian representatives announced a referendum on 
cultural economy for Serbs in Croatia. Croatian government sent police 
forces to stop the referendum, in response to which Serbs blocked some 
of the roads. This is when the JNA intervened for the first time, using 
two MIG-21 aeroplanes to intercept three Croatian helicopters with 15 po-
lice flying to Gra~ac and Knin and order them to return to base. Al-
though it was reported that the planes intervened because the helicopters 
had not followed their route, it was clear that the JNA openly took the 
side of Croatian Serbs.21 Serbian referendum was held on August 19, 
1990, and its results showed that a large majority of Serbs who had taken 
the vote, decided on cultural autonomy as long as Yugoslavia remained a 
federal state, and joining Serbia if Yugoslavia became a confederal state.22 
By the end of August 1990, the rebellion spread to the area of Banija. 
Local Serbs attacked and occupied Croatian police stations in Knin, Dvor 
na Uni, Gra~ac, Benkovac, Glina and Obrovac, which was followed by the 
exile of non-Serbian population from these areas. Contrary to Serbian and 
the majority of Western reports, Croatian government was surprisingly pas-
sive and did not do much to stop Serbian actions in Kninska krajina and 
Banija. This might be explained by the fact that at that time Croatian 
Serbs were far better armed than Croatians, which provided Serbs with 
strategic advantage. 
 
  21Blagoje Ad`i}, the JNA Chief of General Staff at the time, threatened the 
Croatian government with war if a single Serbian life was lost. See: Vjesnik, 
August 18, 1990, p. 2 
  22Electoral rolls for this referendum, which was organized by the SDS, came 
into possession of Croatian authorities later in the war, and were in some areas 
the basis for taking repressive measures against Serbian population. 
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 In autumn of 1990 there were many incidents in which Serbian forces 
attacked the Croatian police.23 Existing conflicts and preparations for fu-
ture ones were intensified after the Statute of the “Serbian Autonomous 
District of Krajina” was passed in Knin on December 21, 1990 and after 
the Croatian Constitution was passed on December 22, 1990. The situation 
got even worse when the resolution separating “SAO Krajina” from the 
Republic of Croatia was adopted in Knin on February 28, 1991. A mass 
rally attended by 70,000 (by some sources 200,000) Serbs from Croatia 
and other parts of SFRY, which was held on Petrova Gora near Karlovac 
on March 4, 1991, was supposed to express strong Yugoslav feelings. 
However, contrary to what had been planned, it was charged with Serbian 
nationalism.24 At the end of the rally Serbian nationalists engaged in open 
confrontation with Serbs who advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia, 
thus bringing Great-Serbian plans out into the open. By declaring the area 
of Plitvice Serbian national property, the Serbian side managed to provoke 
the first major conflict with Croatian forces. In order to prevent this, the 
Croatian Ministry of the Interior took action on March 30, 1991. Two 
men were killed, and several wounded in the conflict with Serbian forces. 
Croatian police reestablished its station in the area, but was soon encircled 
by the forces of the JNA and forced to withdraw. The tension in Kninska 
krajina reached its peak when Serbian forces and JNA troops blocked the 
Croatian village Kijevo near Knin, and the conflict between Serbian forces 
and Croatian police in Pakrac (Western Slavonia) on April 6 resulted in 
the involvement of the JNA in the conflict. 
 Soon after that another front was opened after the killing of 12 Croa-
tian police in Borovo selo (near Vukovar) on May 2, 1991. A large num-
ber of Serbian volunteers from Srem and Vojvodina (Serbia) got involved 
in the conflict in that area. After the conflict in Borovo selo, the situation 
in Croatia got even more complicated. In the period following that conflict 
the Presidency of SFRY ordered deployment of the JNA in all areas with 
Serbian majority in order to stop “ethnic conflicts”. This political decision 
allowed Serbian forces to involve in further provocations and attacks on 
Croatian forces. 
 Two days after a large majority of Croatian citizens voted for Croatian 
independence at the referendum held on May 18-19, 1991, Serbs in “SAO 
Krajina” decided to separate from Croatia. Political and organizational pre-
requisites for an open armed conflict were created. 
 
 
  23According to a report issued by the Croatian Ministry of Interior “in 1990 
there were 390 explosions, 297 armed assaults, 436 criminal charges were filed 
against known perpetrators of criminal acts, and 80 people were held in custody. 
They were citizens of Serbian nationality”. Cf. Vjesnik, July 4, 1991, p. 5. 
  24Retired general Du{an Peki} talked at the rally and threatened to arrest 
Franjo Tu|man and his government. 
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 Stage of intensive armed conflicts in the period between June 27, 1991 and 
January 2, 1992 
 At this stage Serbian forces intensified their attacks on Croatian villages 
and cities in various areas, and several fronts were gradually formed. The 
frontlines were approaching major Croatian cities. As a result, Drni{ fell 
on September 16, 1991, Hrvatska Kostajnica on September 19, and 
Petrinja on September 21. Many other towns like Gospi}, Karlovac, Sisak, 
[ibenik, Zadar, Vukovar and Osijek were directly threatened. In order to 
strengthen their defense, Croatian forces attacked JNA barracks to get 
hold of substantial quantities of weapons. As a result of largely successful 
takeovers of JNA barracks in September 1991, Croatian forces were signifi-
cantly strengthened.  
 The turning point of the war in Croatia was the offensive which the 
JNA started on October 5, 1991. This is when Western military experts 
believed that Croatia would be subjugated within 2 weeks. However, Croa-
tian resistance proved to be much stronger than expected. The key factor 
of the Croatian resistance and further development of the Croatian Army 
was the four-month siege of Vukovar in Eastern Slavonia. Although Vuk-
ovar fell on November 18, 1991, Croatian defense inflicted huge losses on 
two elite JNA corpses.25 The long siege of Vukovar provided precious 
time for Croatian army to strengthen its defense and stop the Serbian 
forces and the JNA. Towards the end of 1991 the balance of powers 
gradually changed in favour of Croatia. Croatian Army made use of this 
situation by starting an offensive with the aim to win back the territory of 
Western Slavonia. However, due to the fact that cease-fire was signed in 
Sarajevo on January 1992, this action was only partly completed. At the 
same time, Croatian Army successfully completed the operation in the 
south of Croatia the purpose of which was to defend Dubrovnik.26 
 
 
  25According to foreign sources, Croatian Army destroyed about 600 tanks and 
armored vehicles and about 8000 Serbian soldiers. Croatian losses were estimated 
to be 1800, and 2600 people were reported missing. See: Vego Milan, “The 
Croatian Army”, Jane's Intelligence Review, No. 5/1993, pp. 203-210. 
  26Attacks on Dubrovnik did not cease after the Sarajevo cease-fire agreement 
and were continued until the cease-fire agreement on Dubrovnik region was 
reached on July 20, 1992. 
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 Stage of international peace efforts and limited military actions in the pe-
riod between January 3, 1992 and April 30, 1995 
 Operation UNPROFOR 
 Peace in Croatia was to be restored by the UN Security Council, 
which expressed readiness to send its troops to Croatia and deploy them 
in crisis areas. According to the peace plan those were “areas with Ser-
bian majority or significant minority and where the tension between com-
munities led to armed conflicts in recent past. As previously mentioned, 
special arrangements in these areas are to be of a temporary nature and 
should not be prejudicial to the outcome of political negotiations aimed at 
reaching a universal solution to the Yugoslav crisis.”27 According to the 
UN peace plan, all areas under Serbian supervision at the time of the 
Carafe cease-fire were brought under UN protection. 
 Main provisions of the UN peace plan aimed at reaching peace in 
Croatia were emphasized in UN General Secretary's report of February 5, 
1992. In his report he emphasizes that there are two major points in the 
plan: 1) “complete withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Croatia and 
demilitarization of the UNPA zones” and 2) “continued operation, on a 
temporary basis, of local authorities and police, but under UN supervi-
sion”.28 Key elements of the peace plan for Croatia were also the follow-
ing: 1) “UN forces will not withdraw until a universal political solution to 
the Yugoslav crisis is reached”, 2) “Arrival of peacekeeping forces is not 
prejudicial to the outcome of political processes - on the contrary, their 
goal is to stop the fighting and create circumstances for the beginning of 
political negotiations”, 3) “Respecting the existing local authorities and the 
maintenance of law and order in UNPA zones, the arrival of peace forces 
will not change the status quo”, 4) “In the transitional period UNPA 
zones will not comply with laws and institutions of the Republic of Croa-
tia”, 5) “UN forces will protect the local people and guarantee their 
safety during and after UNPA demilitarization”.29 
 According to official data, at the very beginning of the peace opera-
tion, UNPROFOR staff included 13,240 military, 521 police and 542 civil-
ians. Soldiers had 1100 vehicles at their disposal, police forces and civilian 
observers 345. There were 2 passenger and 2 transport planes, as well as 
4 medium and 2 light helicopters. UN forces were armed with infantry 
 
  27Tatalovi} Sini{a, Military Aspects of the Peacekeeping Operation in Croatia, 
Croatian Political Science Review, No. 2/1993, pp. 59-60. 
  28Vjesnik, February 6, 1992, p. 2. 
  29Tatalovi} Sini{a, “Military Aspects of the Peacekeeping Operation in Croatia”, 
Croatian Political Science Review, No. 2/1993, p. 61. 
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weapons, armored vehicles and light tanks.30 Their primary task was to en-
sure the implementation of the peace plan and a political solution to the 
crisis in the four areas under UN protection (E, W, N, S). In spite of all 
the efforts of the UN peace forces to provide a peaceful solution to the 
Croato-Serbian conflict in Croatia they failed, the exception being Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem. 
 
 Operation Miljevac 
 In the military action conducted on June 21, 1992, Serbian forces were 
moved further away from [ibenik and Vodice, and seven villages on the 
Miljevac plateau were liberated by the Croatian forces. Serbs suffered sig-
nificant losses in this operation, primarily due to the surprise element. UN 
Security Council condemned this operation by issuing Resolution 762, re-
quiring the withdrawal of Croatian forces. However, the resolution was not 
implemented, which is why political implications of this action were more 
significant than its military implications, since it tested the international 
community's stand on such actions.31 
 
 Operation Maslenica and Action Peru~a 
 Croatian forces performed a limited action (under the codename 
“Operation Maslenica”) with the aim to push the Serbian forces off key 
positions around Maslenica, Zemunik (airport) near Zadar and the Peru~a 
Dam. The action started on January 22, 1993, but was stopped four days 
later, although all its goals had not been achieved. Croatian forces did not 
manage to move Serbs from the position from which they threatened 
Masleni~ko `drilo ( strait which is a vital link between Dalmatia and 
northern part of Croatia) and the coastal towns: Biograd, Zadar and 
[ibenik. Strange things happened in the course of the operation since nei-
ther side had a significant advantage. For example, Croatian tanks stopped 
before entering Benkovac, whereas Serbian forces for no obvious reason 
stopped a successful offensive on Novigrad, a small town providing control 
over Masleni~ko `drilo. Both sides suffered relatively big losses in this op-
eration.32 Security Council and UNPROFOR responded immediately con-
demning this action as a one-sided act of the Croatian Army, interfering 
 
  30Sini{a Tatalovi}, “UNPROFOR od Sarajeva do mira”, Vjesnik, March 29, 
1992, p. 11. 
  31For more details see: Javorovi} Bo`idar, Velikosrpska najezda i obrana 
Hrvatske, DEFIMI, Zagreb, 1995, pp. 236-238. 
  32According to an UNPROFOR report, Croatian losses included 60 dead and 
many wounded, with Serbian losses being estimated at 200 dead and many more 
wounded. 
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with their peace mission.33 They required cessation of hostilities and with-
drawal of the Croatian Army to the positions they had held prior to the 
action. However, Croatian Army not only refused to withdraw, but soon 
after that, on January 27-28 engaged in an operation for the liberation of 
the Peru~a Dam and the surrounding area. Croatian attack on Maslenica 
and Peru~a revealed a significant weakness in combat readiness and effi-
ciency of the Serbian forces in Kninska krajina as well as the failure of 
UNPROFOR to stop Croatian military and police actions. 
 
 Action “Meda~ki d`ep” (Medak pocket) 
 The action was started on September 9, 1993 by Croatian forces con-
sisting of two Croatian Army brigades and special police units, which at-
tacked Meda~ki d`ep near Gospi}, which was defended by the Medak bat-
talion of the Li~ki corps. Due to the superiority of the Croatian forces, 
the action was completed in only five hours, and the Serbian side suffered 
great losses, particularly among civilians. Due to civilian casualties the UN 
Security Council and UNPROFOR responded immediately, accusing the 
Croatian forces of committing war crimes. The response of the Croatian 
side to these accusations can be seen in a field report which says: “One 
of the women (called grandmother Danica), although at a very old age, 
was firing from a machine gun; another woman killed herself with a hand 
grenade. The other three women attempted to escape through the rugged 
terrain of the Medak pocket. (...) During the lightning action, fight was 
carried on for every house which served as a stronghold of the paramili-
tary forces, and it is possible that some women who were engaged in the 
logistics, were in the fighting zone and thus got killed in the crossfire or 
by hand grenades.”34 
 
 Stage of final liberation of Croatia from May 1, 1995 
 Operation Flash 
 In the operation “Flash”, Croatian forces were supposed to liberate the 
occupied area of Western Slavonia between Oku~ani and Novska (25 km) 
and in the depth of 37 km to Pakrac. About 15,000 people used to live 
in this area, most of whom were Serbs, who had about 3000 soldiers or-
ganized according to the territorial principle within the 18th Corps of the 
 
  33See: Ekwall-Uebelhart Barbara and Raevsky Andrei, Managing Arms in Peace 
Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 
Geneva, 1996, pp. 38-39. 
  34Vjesnik, November 3, 1993, quoted from: @unec Ozren, “Hrvatska u sukobu 
niskog intenziteta”, Erazmus, No. 7/1994, p. 55. 
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“Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina”. The area of Western Slavonia 
was under the supervision of the UN peacekeeping forces which had de-
ployed three battalions, civilian police and observers, totalling 3100 peo-
ple.35 This operation had been long and thoroughly prepared by the Croa-
tian side. It was preceded by the agreement reached with the Serbian side 
about opening the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway.36 The implementation of the 
agreement, which allowed the use of the motorway, enabled the Croatian 
side to get hold of important intelligence information on the enemy forces 
and prepare the psychological and propaganda aspect of the operation. Af-
ter an incident that occurred on the motorway and was caused by a Croa-
tian, local Serbs responded attacking a civilian vehicle, thus providing the 
Croatian side with a pretext for the attack. On the night of April 30, and 
May 1, 1995 Croatians concentrated their military and police forces west 
of Novska, east of Oku~ani near Nova Gradi{ka and north of Pakrac with 
30,000 men. 
 After the Croatian Ministry of Defense notified the UN forces com-
mand at 2.30 a.m., at 5.30 a.m. a fierce artillery attack was launched on 
Serbian positions. This was followed by an attack launched by Croatian 
armored and mechanized units and supported by Croatian airforce along 
the line between Oku~ani and Novska and the line towards Pakrac and 
Jasenovac. Unprepared for defense, Serbian forces were soon demoralized 
and ceased to resist, which is why the Croatian forces accomplished their 
chief operation goals in only 24 hours: they regained control over the mo-
torway between Novska and Nova Gradi{ka, liberated Jasenovac and encir-
cled Serbian forces near Pakrac.37 Continuing the operation, on May 2, 
1995 Croatian forces liberated the entire area and started searching 
through the woody land around Pakrac for groups of Serbian fighters who 
refused to surrender. Establishment of Croatian civilian authorities started 
as early as May 3, 1995. 
 Data on casualties in this operation show that Croatian forces had sev-
eral dozens of dead, while the Serbian side had far more casualties, par-
ticularly among civilians and that they ranged from 300 to 400 dead. Most 
casualties were killed under strong artillery fire of the Croatian forces and 
during the joint withdrawal of Serbian soldiers and civilians towards 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
  35Argentinean battalion was based in Daruvar, Jordanian battalion in Novska 
and Nepali battalion in Nova Gradi{ka. 
  36This agreement was part of an overall agreement on economic issues, which 
was signed by representatives of the Republic of Croatia and Croatian rebel Serbs 
on December 2, 1994, see: Ve~ernji list, December 3, 1994, pp. 2-3. 
  37In the area around Pakrac 5000 civilians and about 1000 soldiers of the 18th 
Corps of the Krajina Army were caught in encirclement. About 7000 civilians and 
2000 soldiers crossed the Sava bridges at Jasenovac and between Stara Gradi{ka 
and Bosanska Gradi{ka into Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
Tatalovi}, S., Military and Political Aspects..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIII, (1996), No. 5, pp. 166—190 185 
                                                                                                                                              
 UN forces did not respond to the Croatian attack, but only withdrew 
from their positions. Nevertheless, the response of UN followed, condemn-
ing the Croatian action. However, due to Serbian retribution on May 3-4, 
1995, when rockets were launched on Zagreb, resulting in civilian casual-
ties, the international community soon accepted the new situation con-
demning Serbian attacks on Zagreb. 
 
 Operation Storm 
 Making use of the favorable military and political situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovia, when the Western forces were outraged by Serbian occupation 
of the protection zones of @epa and Srebrenica and the threats Biha} was 
facing due to actions of Serbian forces from “Krajina”, Croatia was en-
gaged in intensive preparation for the liberation of the occupied areas. 
Encouraged by its success in Western Slavonia, the well-organized and 
armed Croatian Army displays its power at the military parade in Zagreb 
on May 30 in order to make the Serbian side accept serious political ne-
gotiations. In spite of this, the Serbian side refuses political negotiations 
on the status of “Krajina” within Croatia, as well as the offer made by 
the international community, which was contained in the “Z-4” plan.38 The 
contents of the “Z-4” plan were strongly criticized by some Krajina high-
ranking officials, one of whom says: “Not a single provision of this plan 
contradicts Croatian goals, which were set in the 19th century and whose 
achievement was drastically attempted in World War II. This is about cre-
ating an ethnically clean Croatian state by all means. This Croatian goal 
cannot be obstructed by the establishment of Serbian autonomy in the ar-
eas of Krajina with a population which has become scarce - both through 
genocide in World War II and by planned migrations in former Yugosla-
via. It is unprofessional to present such an autonomy as an opportunity 
for sweeping authorities and rights of Serbian people”.39 
 When the Croatian President returned from Brijuni and the last diplo-
matic efforts in Geneva failed, it was clear that the decision was made to 
attack “Krajina”. By concentrating substantial forces around the occupied 
areas, Croatia aimed to create circumstances for fast penetrations deep 
into the enemy's lines, crushing them and liberating the entire Krajina 
 
  38After extensive consultations this plan was devised by the ambassadors of the 
USA, the Russian Federation, Great Britain and France accredited to Zagreb. The 
plan included a high level of autonomy for Krajina Serbs. Although accepted by 
the Croatian side as a starting point for negotiations, Croatian negotiators felt it 
would allow the Serbs to have a “state within the state”. Serbian leadership in 
Knin refused to negotiate this plan. 
  39Jar~evi} Slobodan, “Plan Z-4 neprihvatljiv za RSK”, Me|unarodna politika, No. 
1032/1995, p. 10. 
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area in a relatively short period of time.40 Apart from the regular Croa-
tian Army units, additional 70,000 soldiers were mobilized for the attack 
as well as 50,000 reserves. A total of 200,000 members of the Croatian 
Army (active and reserve) made up 25 fully equipped brigades.41 These 
forces supported by special police forces confronted Serbian forces of 
37,000 soldiers from “Krajina" and about 12,000 soldiers from Eastern Sla-
vonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium.42 
 The attack on Serbian positions was launched on August 4 at 5 a.m. 
by fierce artillery onslaughts after the Croatian side had notified UNPRO-
FOR one hour before. Serbian military targets along the 600 km long 
frontline were attacked as well as their liaison system and command cen-
ters. As soon as the operation (named “Storm”) started, Croatian media 
broadcasted the message of the Croatian President to Serbian citizens 
which, among others, contained the following: “Since all efforts made by 
the Croatian government and the international community for a peaceful 
reintegration of the occupied Croatian territories have failed, including yes-
terday's negotiations in Geneva, Croatia is forced to undertake military 
and police measures for regaining control of the above mentioned territo-
ries. (...) We are appealing to Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality, who 
have not been actively involved in the rebellion, to stay in their homes 
and accept Croatian authorities without fearing for their lives or property. 
Their civil rights are guaranteed and elections for local self-government 
under the Croatian Constitution and Constitutional Law will be held under 
international supervision...”43 Apart from this, Serbian irregulars were in-
vited to surrender and lay down arms, being guaranteed amnesty, and 
Serbian leadership in Knin was invited to capitulate. 
 In the morning of August 4, Croatian forces made forays in 30 direc-
tions gaining control over a huge area, fully or partly encircling Serbian 
strongholds. Croatian airforce destroyed the enemy relay system ]elavac 
and commands of one corps and one brigade. During the first day of the 
operation units of the Croatian Army made forays of 5 to 15 kilometers. 
 
  40Although being warned by its friends that the resistance of the Serbian forces 
would be fierce, and that the operation was likely to succeed only if completed in 
a short time, the decision to attack was based on intelligence estimates that SR 
Yugoslavia would not get involved in the conflict. American intelligence estimated 
that Croatian operation would be a success only if completed within seven to ten 
days with estimated Croatian losses of 1000 dead and put out of action. See: 
Vi{nar, Fran, “Na{e `rtve cijena su vje~ne slobode”, Vjesnik, August 13, 1995, p. 
20. 
  41Croatian forces had about 350 armored and mechanized devices, 2000 artillery 
pieces and 40-45 rocket systems. 
  42Serbian forces had about 250 armored and mechanized devices, 250 artillery 
pieces and 20-25 rocket systems. 
  43Vjesnik, August 5, 1995, pp. 1-2. 
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At the end of the first day of the operation the spokesman of the Minis-
try of Defense said at the press conference that 80% of all planned com-
bat tasks had been accomplished. By creating a favorable tactical and op-
erational basis for the continuation of combative activities, the second 
stage of the operation started. This stage included the introduction of new 
soldiers into combat, further fast advancement deep into the battlefield 
thus intercepting Serbian defense at all levels, from operational to tactical. 
The advancement of the Croatian forces on the second day of the opera-
tion was facilitated by panic and breakdown of Serbian forces. Realizing 
that Yugoslavia was not going to get involved in the conflict and with 
Bosnian Serbs being unable to join them, Serbian commanders withdrew 
their units from positions. They were joined by civilians, who fled these 
areas in huge numbers. One of the reasons for this was Croatian propa-
ganda that was broadcasted on Serbian radio stations “Petrova gora”, 
“Korenica” and “Knin” as “Serbian radio program”, thus spreading misin-
formation. Knin44 was liberated on the second day of the operation, which 
meant the end of organized Serbian resistance in the sector “South”. 
Having entered Knin, Croatian forces were supposed to join the forces of 
the 5th Corps of the Bosnian Army, which they did on the same day. 
Unlike the fast successes in the south of “Krajina”, fierce battles were 
fought in its northern part, where Serbian forces put up fierce resistance 
not allowing passage to the Croatian forces in directions Karlovac-Vojni} 
and Sisak-Petrinja. However, due to fierce Croatian attacks on the third 
and fourth day of the operation and fearing full encirclement, the Serbian 
forces in the area of Kordun and Banija started withdrawing towards Bos-
nia-Herzegovina. Some Serbian units and civilians managed to withdraw, 
while others failed, remaining encircled. Upon negotiations on surrender, 
these soldiers and civilians were allowed to leave for Serbia taking the 
motorway Zagreb-Belgrade.45 
 To the surprise of many, Croatia managed to complete the operation 
“Storm” in only four days, achieving all the set goals with minimal casual-
ties. Serbian side was completely defeated, which lead to an exodus un-
precedented in this area. In only four days 120,000 Serbs left the area 
liberated by Croatian forces. The invitation of the Croatian President was 
accepted by only about 5000 Serbs, largely old people. The operation was 
followed by expressions of satisfaction on the Croatian side, but also by 
devastation of the liberated area through looting of the abandoned prop-
 
  44The defense of Knin was less likely to be successful after the successfully 
completed operation “Summer '95”, when joint HVO and Croatian forces reached 
the hinterland of Knin from the Bosnian side. 
  45Passing through some Croatian villages on their way to Serbia, the convoy of 
Serbian refugees was attacked and stoned by Croatian civilian, which is why the 
American ambassador to Croatia joined it as an act of solidarity. 
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erty, setting fire to houses, and a few killings of Serbian civilians.46 In re-
sponse to this the international community required the Croatian govern-
ment to stop such activities, which are discreditable for a civilized and 
democratic state. 
 
 Peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium 
 There was another conflict of Croatian and Serbian forces on the divi-
sion line in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, which oc-
curred at the same time as the operation “Storm”. However, on this bat-
tleground neither side launched an offensive - it was an exchange of in-
fantry and artillery fire. Assessing the likeliness of this battleground to 
trigger an all-out Croato-Serbian war, the international community led by 
the United States took energetic steps to prevent the conflict from esca-
lating in this area, first by negotiating a cease-fire, which was followed by 
the Erdut agreement47, which was, politically speaking, the first step in the 
process of peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of 
Croatia. According to the Erdut agreement, the area controlled by Serbs 
was to be demilitarized, and under international supervision in a two-year 
transitional period conditions allowing implementation of local elections in 
this area were to be created, which would be a prerequisite for the 
integration of this area into the Republic of Croatia. The first year of the 
UN mandate for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium has 
shown that the process of peaceful reintegration of this region has 
significantly advanced in all areas including that of security. 
 The letter which the Croatian government addressed to the UN Secu-
rity Council on the finalization of the peaceful reintegration of the area 
under UN transitional administration (UNTAES)48 was supported by the 
Council, which suggests that the process of peaceful reintegration is likely 
to be successfully completed by the summer of 1997. Local elections which 
will be held on March 16, 1997 will certainly facilitate this. As a result, 
 
  46Croatian people and the international community were regularly informed 
about these incidents by the Croatian Helsinki Committee and numerous 
international organizations for the protection of human rights operating in Croatia. 
These incidents were also included in several resolutions and statements made by 
the President of the UN Security Council. 
  47Erdut Agreement was signed on November 16, 1995 by Hrvoje [arini} for the 
Croatian side and Milan Milanovi} for the Serbian side. The Agreement, including 
14 items, was also signed by Thorvald Stoltenberg and Peter Galbraiht. 
  48The text of the letter in which the Croatian governments confirms the 
minority rights for the Serbian community as guaranteed by the Constitution and 
other laws was published in Ve~ernji list, January 16, 1997, p. 2. 
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the Republic of Croatia will be able to establish control over its entire 
territory reaching its internationally recognized borders. This act will 
represent the actual end of the six-year Croato-Serbian war on the terri-
tory of Croatia. 
 
 Consequences of the Croato-Serbian conflict and war in 
 Croatia 
 The consequences of the Croato-Serbian conflict and war in Croatia are 
manifold - they are spiritual, material and political. Every war results in 
casualties and human suffering. The war in Croatia was a case in point. 
At its early stage people were largely victims of individual or group acts 
of violence, but as the war progressed most casualties resulted from mili-
tary actions or explosive devices and mines that had not been cleared. Ac-
cording to the Croatian Office for Casualties of War, in the 1991-1993 pe-
riod, a total of 6900 people were killed on the Croatian side, 31.10% be-
ing civilians. There were 26,394 wounded, out of which 28.40% were civil-
ians. As many as 14,806 people were reported missing.49 Due to war op-
erations in 1994 and 1995, the number of casualties is larger, particularly 
taking into account casualties on the Serbian side, for which there are yet 
no reliable data. 
 All wars are accompanied by a certain number of refugees and dis-
placed persons. The war in Croatia was marked by a huge number of 
refugees and displaced persons due to the type of conflict in both Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. They fled their homes due to the policy of ethnic 
cleansing or media generated fear and were largely directed towards their 
countries of origin; Croatians fled to Croatia, Serbs to Serbia. Some of 
them fled to other countries. At the peak of the refugee crisis, Croatia 
provided shelter for 240,501 people from Croatia and 248,089 people from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Upon operations “Flash” and “Storm” the majority of 
refugees and displaced persons found permanent residence, either by re-
turning to their homes or by being allotted property belonging to Serbian 
refugees. Estimates are that, unlike Croatian refugees and displaced per-
sons, 400,000 Serbs who fled their homes during the war in Croatia are 
not very likely to return to Croatia. 
 Modern wars are characterized by increasing material and economic 
damages occurring both directly, in the course of war operations, and indi-
rectly, as their result throughout a longer period of time. The war in 
Croatia caused huge damages, both direct and indirect, which cannot be 
 
  49Source: Croatian Office for Victims of War, quoted from: Javorovi} Bo`idar, 
Velikosrpska najezda i obrana Hrvatske, DEFIMI, Zagreb, pp. 255-283. 
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fully estimated yet. By the end of 1993 accumulated war damages 
amounted to $US 22 billion.50 
 Consequences of the war in Croatia with the longest lasting effects are 
political ones. After this war nothing has remained the same in Croatia. 
Croatia has realized its political goals earlier and with fewer casualties 
than the most optimistic ones expected. Apart from international recogni-
tion and control of almost its entire state territory, Croatia has built a re-
spectable armed force and the Serbian share in its population has been 
reduced to 3%. However, the war in Croatia has significantly slowed down 
the development of democratic processes, which was reflected in the diffi-
culties Croatia has been facing regarding its entrance to European integra-
tion processes. The Serbian side in this war is the loser in all respects. 
Serbian rebels in Croatia and their policy have led not only to the exodus 
of Serbs from Croatia, but also to putting Serbs who have remained in 
Croatia in a socially difficult position. Acting on orders resulting from the 
global Serbian policy instead of representing their own interests and coor-
dinating them with Croatian interests, the leadership of rebel Serbs in 
Croatia became an instrument of global national policy. With the break-
down of Serbian national policy and the abandonment of its goal to cre-
ate a large national state, Croatian Serbs became victim of that policy. 
Rebel Serbs became aware of its consequences and their difficult position 
when it was too late for any change. Serbs in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja 
and Western Sirmium are an exception to this, being given a second 
chance owing to the efforts of the international community. 
 
  50Javorovi} Bo`idar, op. cit., p. 291. 
